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Working Paper 1: Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion
Jonathon Chierchio
Criminal Justice Capstone
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I.

Introduction
In the United States, more than 90 percent of all settled criminal cases are resolved due

to plea bargaining (Alkon, 2017; Devers, 2011). Plea bargaining is a process in which a defendant
pleads guilty to the charges they were arrested on in exchange for a lighter sentence. Plea
bargaining is an incredibly effective tool for increasing efficiency in the criminal justice system,
as without it, judges and lawyers would be flooded with caseloads, rendering them incapable of
doing their jobs effectively. Plea bargaining can benefit defendants. As a result of plea bargaining,
defendants may receive shorter sentences and have less significant crimes on their criminal
record. Plea bargaining can also help defendants avoid serving jail time altogether in many cases,
allowing defendants to continue with their day to day lives. Plea bargaining, while having its
upsides, can also have several negative impacts on defendants. During the plea bargaining
process, the prosecutor serves as the sole adjudicator in cases during which they coerce
defendants (Langer, 2006). Current practices give the prosecutor near executive authority when
it comes to the charging and handling of plea negotiations for each defendant, creating room for
abuse. Abuses on behalf of the prosecutor in the plea bargaining process can serve to undermine
the American criminal justice system and can violate defendant’s constitutional rights to a fair
trial. Very little legislation exists which regulates the power of the prosecutor in the plea
bargaining process in both substantive and constitutional law (Crespo, 2018). This lack of
regulation makes plea bargaining a process ripe for abuse and corruption. This paper will provide
an overview of current plea bargaining practices and the impact prosecutors can have on
outcomes through various abuses of power, as well as discuss different regulations that exist
which impact plea bargaining.
5

II.

Current Plea Bargaining Practices
A 2011 research summary found that in 2003, there were 75,573 total cases which were

settled in federal district courts (Devers, 2011). Of that total, approximately 95 percent of those
cases were settled by a guilty plea. More updated numbers from the Vera Institute of Justice
indicate that “97 percent [of cases were resolved by plea] in large urban state courts in 2009 and
90 percent in federal courts in 2014,” (Subramanian et al., 2020). Scholars estimate that
anywhere from 90-95 percent of all criminal cases are settled by plea bargaining in the United
States (Alkon, 2017; Devers, 2011). In most cases, plea bargains themselves take place behind
closed doors away from the public, and are incredibly informal in nature (Subramanian et al.,
2020). There is also little to zero documentation required of the actors in plea bargains to ensure
fair practice, and final plea deals are also rarely ever recorded (Subramanian et al., 2020).
The Role of the Prosecutor
After the arrest of a defendant, it is the prosecutor who oversees every step of the
criminal process until sentencing, where the judge theoretically takes over. This means the
prosecutor oversees deciding whether to charge each defendant and which crimes to charge
them with, on top of extending plea deals themselves (Greth, 2018). Should a prosecutor decline
to charge a defendant, the case is dropped, and the defendant is free to go. This is known as
dismissal. Should the prosecutor choose to charge a defendant, they must then choose which
crimes to charge that defendant with. Prosecutors have the option of engaging in vertical or
horizontal charging, or a combination of both. Vertical charging is when a prosecutor will charge
a defendant with the same crime, but with different degrees (Greth, 2018). Horizontal charging
is when a prosecutor charges a defendant with multiple different crimes for the same offense.
6

There is large room for abuse in the charging process. These abuses will be covered in a later
section.
After charges have been assigned to the defendant, it is then the prosecutor who must
decide whether they will offer a plea deal. Should the prosecutor decide to do this, they then
have full control of the characteristics of the deal, whether it be reducing time served, altering
charges, or a combination of both options. There is typically a standard plea offer for each
different type of offense, but prosecutors are free to modify deals in whatever way they see fit
(Greth, 2018). There are a multitude of ways in which the offering of pleas can be coercive in
nature to defendants, or for prosecutors to use their biases to harm certain groups. These
methods of abuse will also be covered in a later section.
Legal and Extralegal Factors
There are several legal factors that prosecutors take into consideration when offering
pleas, including the seriousness of the current offense, the defendant’s criminal history, and the
likelihood a defendant will plead guilty (Devers, 2011). These same legal characteristics all impact
the defendant’s likelihood to accept a plea, as well as the type of lawyer the defendant has and
the defendant’s pre-trial detention status (Devers, 2011; Kellough and Wortley, 2002).
Certain extralegal characteristics were also found to have an impact on the likelihood of
a defendant to receive a reduced plea charge. There is a consistent relationship between race
and plea offers. Black defendants are more likely to receive worse plea offers than white
defendants (Devers, 2011; Greenberg, 2021). Greenberg (2021) posits that within the United
States there is a “racialized presumption of guilt” which has emerged and significantly impacts
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outcomes for Black men. She identifies three aspects of the negotiating process which allow this
presumption to manifest: the speed of the negotiation process, the unawareness of prosecutors’
and defense attorneys’ own implicit biases, and prosecutorial discretion in deciding outcomes
(Greenberg, 2021). Both legal and extralegal factors have been found to have profound impacts
on the plea bargaining process. These factors will be explored further in a future paper.
Outcomes
Plea bargains are expected to yield more favorable outcomes for defendants than going
to trial. One study reviewed by the Vera Institute found that “the odds of incarceration were 2.7
times greater for people tried by a jury than for those who pled guilty,” (Subramanian et al.,
2020). The same study also found that sentence lengths for those who went to trial were 57
percent longer than those who pled guilty. Many studies have found supporting evidence that
plea bargaining does indeed give defendants a “discount,” however there is significant variation
in the level of discount offered. On one end of the spectrum, Marylanders who pled guilty
received a 350 percent discount compared to those who went to trial, and on the other end of
the spectrum, Washington State residents received no discount in five of the twelve measured
crimes (Subramanian et al., 2020). Overall, the literature has found that accepting a plea bargain
does indeed provide a “bargain” when it comes to sentencing, the severity of which depends on
the offense and jurisdiction.
There is little research which studies the innocent people who have falsely pled guilty to
crimes they did not commit. One reason for this is because it is so difficult to find accurate
measures of innocence, leading researchers to use defendant interviews and exoneration data
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however both of these methods have major flaws (Subramanian et al., 2020). However,
researchers still hypothesize that false guilty pleas are likely more common than false confessions
due to the added incentives that come with accepting a plea. Despite several large limitations,
current research indicates that a large number of innocent people do falsely plead guilty each
year. A study reviewed by the Vera Institute showed that of 166 interviewed attorneys, 148
stated that they had at least one client accept a plea despite maintaining their innocence entirely
(Subramanian et al., 2020).
III.

Potential Abuses
Prosecutors have discretion at every point in time when dealing with defendants. With

this discretion comes power, and that power has potential to be abused. Prosecutors also have
a wide range of tools at their disposal, creating even more leverage for them in plea negotiations
(Subramanian et al., 2020). One article claims that the United States falls into a unilateral system
of justice in which the prosecutor acts as the sole adjudicator when they coerce the defendant
during the plea bargaining process (Langer, 2006). Examples of this would be when prosecutors
overcharge defendants, include unfair trial sentences, and when prosecutors make plea offers in
weak cases (Langer, 2006).
Overcharging
With their power to charge, prosecutors also have the ability to overcharge defendants
for their crimes to coerce them to take a plea deal (Greth, 2018). Greth (2018) defines
overcharging as “when a prosecutor charges the defendant with a greater crime than the
prosecutor could realistically prove.” By doing this, a prosecutor exerts a tremendous amount of
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pressure onto the defendant to accept a plea deal, even if it is unfavorable. Prosecutors may
engage in this practice to avoid going to trial, or to try and guarantee a “win” for themselves
(Greth, 2018). Racial disparities are also present in charging, indicating that extralegal factors also
have an influence on charging decisions as well.
Hard Bargaining Tactics
Prosecutors also have the ability to engage in what Alkon (2017) terms “hard bargaining
tactics,” which are coercive tactics prosecutors can use to persuade defendants to accept pleas.
Prosecutors may use hard bargaining tactics for a number of reasons, including to manage
caseload, have political motivations, or simply because they lack experience and want to win
cases (Alkon, 2017). Examples of hard bargaining tactics include exploding offers, threats to add
enhancements/additional charges, take-it-or-leave-it offers, and threats to seek the death
penalty. Exploding offers are offers in which the prosecutor will set a time limit on an offer in
order to pressure the defendant into pleading guilty (Alkon, 2017). While this practice is not
always coercive and does have appropriate uses, when used solely for the purpose of achieving
a conviction, it can be a very dangerous tool. Prosecutors will also threaten to add enhancements
or additional charges onto a defendant’s case if the defendant rejects their first offer (Alkon,
2017). Enhancements can be added onto some crimes and often mandate a period of
incarceration, and additional charges have the ability to add significantly more prison time. By
threatening to add these to a defendant’s current case, defendants can be scared into accepting
a deal, and innocent people can end up behind bars. Take-it-or-leave-it offers are named fittingly,
as they are defined as when a prosecutor offers a plea deal with no room for negotiation
whatsoever (Alkon, 2017). Without being able to negotiate, defendants are forced to either
10

accept a deal or be forced to go to trial which could lead to a much lengthier sentence. All of
these tactics are incredibly coercive in nature and can lead defendants to plead guilty to
unfavorable deals or, even worse, to crimes they never committed.
The Death Penalty and Plea Bargaining
Prosecutors have the option of threatening to seek the death penalty during plea
negotiations in certain states. This is perhaps the most coercive tactic a prosecutor can use to try
and achieve a conviction, as the defendant has their literal life on the line. Both prosecutors and
defense attorneys alike found that “the option to file a death notice puts the prosecution in a
unique position of strength and affects the defense’s decision regarding a plea in ways that a
potential life or life without parole sentence does not,” (Ehrhard, 2009). Studies have found that
the ability to pursue the death penalty has a significant effect on plea bargaining (Subramanian
et al., 2020). One study conducted in New York State after the reinstatement of the death penalty
in 1995 found that defendants in murder cases were 25 percent more likely to accept pleas than
before the death penalty was reinstated (Subramanian et al., 2020). In Ehrhard’s 2009 study, she
found that more than half of the prosecutors she interviewed admitted to using the death penalty
as a bargaining chip in negotiations. One prosecutor even stated “most of what we do in the
criminal justice system is about the exertion of proper leverage,” (Ehrhard, 2009).
IV.

Regulations
With the incredibly vast majority of cases being resolved by plea bargaining, one may

assume there would be many regulations or laws governing the process. This is not the case. In
fact, there is practically no legislation that mentions plea bargaining in both substantive and
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constitutional criminal law (Crespo, 2018). However, certain laws that may not explicitly mention
plea bargaining still have an impact on the plea bargaining process. For example, the American
Bar Association’s Model Rule 3.8 has been found to have a statistically significant impact on the
rate of plea bargaining (Fletcher, 2019). Two court cases, Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye,
helped to establish new precedents that defense attorneys must inform defendants of and
recommend defendants accept reasonable plea offers (Work, 2014). There also exists a “hidden
third body of law” which establishes the legal frameworks of prosecutorial power, being the subconstitutional state law of criminal procedure (Crespo, 2018). This section will explore these
regulations and their impact on prosecutorial discretion and the plea bargaining process.
Model Rule 3.8
The American Bar Association’s Model Rule 3.8, specifically amendments (g) and (h), have
to do with the prosecutorial handling of exculpatory evidence (Fletcher, 2019). Exculpatory
evidence is evidence that is favorable to the defendant in a trial and can often dissuade
prosecutors from offering plea deals in favor of dismissing these weak cases. While the Brady
Rule establishes that prosecutors must disclose any “material exculpatory evidence” deemed
useful to a defendant, this phrasing still allows prosecutors to use evidence to their advantage
(Fletcher, 2019). Model Rule 3.8 attempts to address this by addressing the ethical handling of
exculpatory evidence and “compels the disclosure of any evidence, even after conviction
(Fletcher, 2019). The amendments also make the prosecutor disclose exculpatory evidence
whenever it is discovered, even if the case does not go to trial. In many states, prosecutors are
not required to release exculpatory evidence in cases that do not go to trial, so this evidence is
oftentimes never discussed in plea negotiations (Fletcher, 2019). Fletcher’s 2019 study sought to
12

examine the impact Model Rule 3.8 had on the rate of plea bargaining in states that adopted
amendments (g) and (h). The study assessed 17 total states, ten which adopted the amendments
to the rule and seven which had not. The study found a statistically significant decrease (13.4%,
R^2 = 0.15) on the rate of plea bargaining in the states which have adopted the amendments
(Fletcher, 2019). This indicates that prosecutors since prosecutors are no longer able to withhold
exculpatory evidence during plea negotiations, prosecutors are more likely to simply dismiss
weak cases rather than try to secure additional convictions to plea agreements.
Lafler v. Cooper & Missouri v. Frye
In 2011, the Supreme Court handed down two rulings on the same day which greatly
impacted the plea bargaining process. In Lafler v. Cooper, repeat offender Anthony Cooper was
charged with multiple crimes and expressed his willingness to accept a plea deal (Work, 2014).
His defense attorney encouraged him not to accept the deal, stating that he was confident the
state would not be able to establish Cooper’s guilt of the crimes he was accused. When the case
went to trial, Cooper was found guilty and sentenced to a mandatory minimum 185 to 360
months imprisonment (Work, 2014). The deal the prosecutor offered was 51 to 85 months
imprisonment. Lafler appealed his case, stating that he would have accepted the deal if not for
the ineffective counsel of his attorney.
In Missouri v. Frye, Galin Frye was offered two different plea deals by a prosecutor.
However, neither of these deals were communicated to Frye by his attorney. Frye was arrested
yet again for the same crime of driving with a revoked license two days before his preliminary
hearing, two days after the plea offers expired (Work, 2014). Frye later pleaded guilty without
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accepting any plea offer and was sentenced to 3 years imprisonment. One of the offers the
prosecutor had initially offered was a reduction from a felony to a misdemeanor and a
recommendation of only 90 days imprisonment (Work, 2014). Work appealed his case, stating
that had he been made aware of the initial plea offers, he would have accepted the 90 day offer
and that this failure amounts to ineffective counsel.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of both Cooper and Frye, establishing important new
precedents in the plea bargaining process (Work, 2014). To be exact, “The Court’s holdings in
these cases make clear that prejudice arising from counsel’s deficient performance extends
beyond acceptance of a guilty plea based on misinformation concerning consequences of a plea,”
(Work, 2014). These cases also establish new legal precedents in the plea bargaining process. As
a result of Missouri v. Frye, a precedent that defense attorneys must inform defendants of all
plea offers available to them has been established. Lafler v. Cooper established a new precedent
that defense attorneys must assess plea offers “relative merits,” so as to properly inform
defendants of offers and ensure any acceptance or denial of an offer is voluntary (Work, 2014).
Sub-Constitutional State Laws of Criminal Procedure
Crespo (2018) posits that while there exists no substantive or constitutional laws to
govern the prosecutor in the plea bargaining process, there is a hidden third body of law known
as the sub-constitutional state law of criminal procedure which regulates and establishes the
mechanisms the prosecutor has at their disposal. Crespo divides these laws into three categories:
piling on, overreaching, and sliding down.
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The law of joinder and the law of severance are two laws under the piling on category,
which establish a prosecutor’s charging power and a judge’s power to sever charges from a case
(Crespo, 2018). Joinder is used to represent the number of charges a prosecutor can file in a case.
For example, if a state grants prosecutors unlimited joinder, they can file as many applicable
charges to the defendant as they would like (Crespo, 2018). On the other end of the spectrum, if
a state grants a prosecutor no joinder, they are only permitted to file one charge per case. This
law is applied differently across the United States, with most states granting prosecutors “similar
offense” joinder, the power to file charges similar to the offense (Crespo, 2018). 43 total states
would fall closer to an unlimited joinder model than a nonjoinder model. This grants prosecutors
a significant amount of power in the charging process. The law of severance also provides a
spectrum of power for judges to sever charges from cases, from having no severance mechanism
at all to allowing judges to strike all charges from a case (Crespo, 2018).
V.

Conclusion
Plea bargaining remains a largely unregulated process, despite some legislation which has

impacted the process in a variety of ways. Still, this low amount of regulation allows for a plethora
of abuses on the behalf of prosecutors. Different types of hard bargaining tactics such as
exploding offers and take-it-or-leave-it offers are extremely coercive in nature and can cause
defendants to accept bad plea offers (Alkon, 2017). Threatening to pursue the death penalty can
also cause a significant increase in the likelihood of a defendant to accept a guilty plea (Ehrhard,
2009; Subramanian et al., 2020). Several legal and extralegal factors can influence the
prosecutor’s charging and plea bargaining decisions, including the severity of the crime, the
criminal history of the defendant, and the race of the defendant (Devers, 2011; Greenberg, 2021;
15

Subramanian et al., 2020). Despite these potentials for abuse, it does not mean that they occur
very often. Outcome statistics have shown that by accepting plea bargains, defendants receive
an average of a 57 percent decrease in their sentence compared to defendants who choose to
go to trial (Subramanian et al., 2020). Plea bargaining is a largely necessary part of the United
States’ current criminal justice system, but it also contains a large room for abuse at this moment
in time.
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I.

Introduction
Prosecutors are handed an incredible amount of discretion to use in their day-to-day

practices. Since the charging and plea bargaining processes are dependent on this discretion,
there is much variability in the charges and sentences which are handed out to defendants. This
variability can be explained through the legal and extralegal factors which prosecutors use to
make their decision. Legal factors are the factors in cases which are directly related to the criminal
justice system, such as the severity of the crime in a case, the defendant’s criminal history, the
detention status of the defendant, as well as several others (Devers, 2011). Extralegal factors are
the factors in cases which are not related to the criminal justice system, such as a defendant’s
age, race, gender, and socioeconomic status (Devers, 2011). Prosecutors are not obligated to
consider extralegal factors when issuing charges or plea offers, but the vast majority of them do,
whether it be explicitly or implicitly (Greth, 2018). Implicit bias regarding a defendant’s
demographics can influence a prosecutor’s decision making process without them even realizing,
which in turn helps create disparities in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing for particular
groups of defendants (Greenberg, 2021; Lu, 2007). This paper will provide an overview of the
legal and extralegal factors which influence prosecutors’ decision-making process in charging and
plea bargaining, as well as discuss the role of implicit bias in a prosecutor’s decision making
process and how implicit bias contributes to certain disparities found in the United States criminal
justice system.
II.

Legal Factors
Naturally, prosecutors consider the legal factors involved in every case they handle when

considering both the initial charge and any plea offers they extend. Prosecutors will consider a
21

variety of factors, but the factors that have the largest impact on their decision-making process
are the severity of the crime, the defendant’s criminal history, and a defendant’s pre-trial
detention status (Devers, 2011). Certain legal characteristics, particularly the severity of the
crime and a defendant’s criminal history, greatly influence a defendant’s likelihood to plead guilty
due to the uncertainty in outcomes should a chronic or serious offender choose to go to trial
(Devers, 2011). Other legal characteristics, such as the type of legal counsel a defendant has, can
have an impact on the plea deals a defendant receives. One study which focused on 166 different
prosecutors in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia found that of the total number of convictions
these prosecutors obtained from 1981-1984 which were secured through plea bargaining
(15,522), 59% involved public defenders and 41% involved private attorneys (Champion, 1989).
In cases in which the charges were dropped, 93% of defendants had private attorneys and just
7% had public defenders (Champion, 1989). Other research suggests that private defense
attorneys and public defenders seek plea bargains at the same rate (McKenzie, 2015). This shows
that private attorneys are more likely to obtain favorable results for their client (dropped charges,
better pleas, etc.), whereas those with a public defender will likely have to settle with some sort
of plea deal.
Crime Severity & Criminal History
Two of the most important factors which prosecutors consider in charging and plea
bargaining are the severity of the crime the defendant is being charged with and the defendant’s
criminal history (Devers, 2011). One study which examines the impacts of legal and extralegal
factors on pleas and sentencing in drunk driving cases unsurprisingly found that the greatest
factor in both plea and sentence severity was the severity of the incident (Meyer & Gray, 1997).
22

Other research done on domestic violence cases to examine the impacts legal and extralegal
factors had on charging decisions revealed that the severity of injury to the victim and the
defendant’s prior criminal record were the most important factors prosecutors considered
(Schmidt & Steury, 1989). In fact, most research in felony courts has reached the same conclusion
that the severity of the crime is the single most important factors which impact sentence severity
(Meyer & Gray, 1997). Other research relating to charge severity has revealed that when
defendants are charged with more severe crimes, they are less likely to plead guilty, however
more serious charges are associated with greater likelihoods of charge reductions (Subramanian
et al., 2020). Studies conducted on the relationship between a defendant’s criminal history and
plea bargaining outcomes found that defendants with more substantial criminal histories are
more likely to receive harsher plea deals for certain charges, and other research found that
defendants with substantial criminal histories are more likely to be offered pleas with
incarceration included than defendants without criminal history (Subramanian et al., 2020).
A study assessing private defense attorney’s and public defender’s motivations for plea
bargaining revealed that the legal factors of a case matter significantly more to public defenders
than for private defense attorneys (McKenzie, 2015). When seeking plea deals, public defenders
were found to consider their defendant’s criminal history as the most important factor, whereas
private attorneys were found to consider their defendant’s trial tax as the most important factor
(McKenzie, 2015). When accepting pleas, private attorneys had no particular factor which
mattered more than any other, but public attorneys considered the type of crime to be the most
important factor (McKenzie, 2015).
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Strength of Evidence
The strength of the evidence in a case is also an important factor for prosecutors and
defense attorneys alike in the plea-bargaining process (Redlich et al., 2016). Prosecutors have
been found to become less willing to engage in plea bargaining when the probability of conviction
is higher, whereas defense attorneys become more willing to plea bargain (Redlich et al., 2016).
Defense attorneys also reported that they do not consider extralegal factors in their decision to
plea bargain and only consider legal factors (e.g., the discount a defendant will get by accepting
a plea offer instead of going to trial) (Redlich et al., 2016). One study which asked 166 prosecutors
revealed that 38% of respondents would increase the harshness of a plea if the evidence was in
their favor, while 82% of respondents would decrease the harshness of a plea if the evidence
were weaker (Subramanian et al., 2020).
In a 2016 study, Redlich et al. assess the “shadow of trial” model, which claims that
decisions to offer, accept, and reject pleas are based on the perceived trial outcome for a given
case (Redlich et al., 2016). Since the strength of the evidence is often the driving factor in
convictions at trial, the authors hypothesize that this also must apply to guilty pleas (Redlich et
al., 2016). Using a sample of 1585 different legal actors (378 prosecutors, 835 defense attorneys,
and 372 judges), the authors conducted a survey in which they were asked about a pleabargaining scenario with 16 different combinations of evidence to which participants were
randomly assigned, as well as 31 legal fact files (e.g., Additional Evidence, Confession Statement,
Defendant’s Race, Alibi, etc.). Participants then answered a series of questions about the previous
scenario. Results of the study show that the fact file checked first most often was Additional
Evidence at 21.9%, the next highest being Defendant’s Prior Record at 19.4% (Redlich et al.,
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2016). It was found that defense attorneys consider a wider range of factors in plea decisionmaking scenarios than prosecutors, and defense attorneys also viewed more files relating to NonEvidentiary Factors and Defendant Characteristics (Redlich et al., 2016). Confession evidence also
significantly increases the likelihood of a defendant pleading guilty. While this is not surprising, it
was found that more than 97% of defendants who confessed to the police pled guilty but did not
receive as good of discounts (Subramanian et al., 2020).
Pre-Trial Detention Status
The pre-trial detention status of a defendant is also an important factor in a prosecutor’s
charging and plea-bargaining decisions, as well as a defendant’s likelihood to plead guilty
(Kellough & Wortley, 2002). A 2002 study in Canada sought to examine different factors which
influence the likelihood of pre-trial detention as well as if those held in pre-trial detention are
more likely to plead guilty than those who are released before trial (Kellough & Wortley, 2002).
The authors also sought to examine whether prosecutors were more likely to drop charges for
those not held in pre-trial detention. The results of their study clearly show that the chance of
coercing a guilty plea from a defendant is greatly enhanced if the defendant is held pre-trial, and
law enforcement is much more likely to drop charges for defendants that are not held pre-trial
(Kellough & Wortley, 2002). While controlling for all other factors. The authors found those who
are held in pre-trial detention are 2.5 times as likely to plead guilty than those who are not
(Kellough & Wortley, 2002). Another study in 2018 further reinforced the negative impact pretrial detention can have on defendants, finding that defendants who were detained were 46%
more likely to plead guilty (Subramanian et al., 2020).
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Some defendants who were held in pre-trial detention explained their reasoning for
pleading guilty to the authors. A portion of them stated that the denial of bail left them with few
other options, while others thought of the denial of bail as an equivalent to a guilty sentence at
trial, so they pleaded guilty to receive lower punishment (Kellough & Wortley, 2002). Overall,
most defendants thought that fighting their charges at trial was a waste of time and it was easier
to plead guilty to move on with their lives (Kellough & Wortley, 2002). These findings are
consistent with other research on pre-trial detention. A 2012 study found that defendants who
were detained reached case dispositions much faster than those who weren’t, largely because
defendants were pleading guilty to get out of jail (Subramanian et al., 2020). There are multiple
other studies which all reinforce the finding that pre-trial detention results in increased negative
outcomes for defendants.
III.

Extralegal Factors
Extralegal factors also play a pivotal role in legal actors’ decision-making processes in both

charging and plea bargaining. Extralegal factors can work in a defendant’s favor and earn them
favorable outcomes, but they can also work against the defendant, even though many extralegal
factors, particularly demographics, are not controllable by the defendant. As stated earlier,
extralegal factors can have an impact on prosecutors’ decision-making without them even
knowing due to implicit bias (Greth, 2018). The race, age, and gender of a defendant all have an
impact on what charge(s) and plea offer(s) the defendant may receive and can even impact
sentencing (Johnson, 2003). A defendant’s socioeconomic status can also have an impact on
criminal justice outcomes. As previously stated, by not being able to afford private counsel,
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defendants are more likely not have their cases dropped and plead guilty to charges (McKenzie,
2015).
Race
The relationship between the race of a defendant and the criminal justice system has
been found to have the most consistent findings in outcomes of all extralegal factors (Devers,
2011). A considerable amount of literature exists which examines the relationship between race
and criminal justice outcomes, at all stages of the criminal justice process. Greenberg (2021)
posits that racial bias is ever present in the plea-bargaining process, and that black people cannot
possibly hope to have the same experience as a white person in plea negotiations. Research on
the relationship between race and charging shows found that black people are less likely to
receive charge reductions than white people, and other research found that black people are less
likely to receive as reduced sentence due to prosecutorial discretion during plea bargaining than
white people (Devers, 2011). In Kellough and Wortley’s (2002) previously mentioned study, they
found that a disproportionate number of black defendants were detained pre-trial (35.5%) than
defendant’s from other racial background (23.4%). Meyer and Gray (1997) found that in their
study of how legal and extralegal factors influence pleas and sentences of drunk drivers that
white people were twice as likely to not plead guilty than black people. This is different than
findings in most other research which suggests black people are less likely to plead guilty because
white people are offered better deals and have more faith in a system “in which bargains are
struck in the dark,” (Meyer & Gray, 1997).
Greenberg’s (2021) article discusses the perpetuation of racial bias in the plea-bargaining
process. Greenberg explains that Brady vs. Maryland was a pivotal point in plea bargaining as it
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ensured that defendants could not be legally coerced into accepting pleas, however Greenberg
posits that the line between coercion and voluntarily pleading guilty is blurry, and not applied in
a “racially-neutral way,” (Greenberg, 2021). Another study conducted in 2003 sought to examine
racial disparities across different modes of conviction, including non-negotiated and negotiated
pleas (Johnson, 2003). The author posited that there would likely be very little prosecutorial
discretion used in non-negotiated pleas, whereas negotiated pleas would have a high level of
discretion applied (Johnson, 2003). The results of this study showed that in negotiated pleas
(which the author hypothesized as having the highest amount of prosecutorial discretion), black
people have 24% worse odds of receiving a downward departure than white people (Johnson,
2003). Miller’s (2020) study of Iowa prison system and its racial disparities revealed that in certain
counties, prosecutors may be abusing their discretion to disproportionately convict black people
of more serious crimes. Miller describes these counties as having a “complete intersection of race
and class which has increased the majority-whiter community’s tolerance for selective
prosecution of African American defendants for more serious offenses (Miller, 2020).
Age
The age of a defendant can also have a rather significant impact on the charges and plea
offers that defendant receives. Johnson’s previously mentioned study which examined racial
disparities across modes of conviction also found a relationship between age and sentence
(Johnson, 2003). In his study, Johnson found that a 65-year-old offender would have 71% greater
odds of receiving a downward departure than a 20-year-old offender (Johnson, 2003). This also
applies to upward departures. Age was found to have a “significant negative effect” on the
likelihood of receiving an upward departure (Johnson, 2003). These findings are consistent with
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other research, which also found younger offenders to be less likely to receive a reduced charge
(Devers, 2011). Kellough & Wortley’s (2002) analysis of the impact of pre-trial detention on plea
bargaining and sentencing found that younger people are more likely to be detained (30.3%)
compared to older people (24.3%). This is not a very big difference, and other research on the
impact of age in plea bargaining remains inconclusive overall (Devers, 2011; Shermer & Johnson,
2010).
Gender
Research on the impact of gender in the charging, negotiating of pleas, and sentencing of
defendants largely suggests males are more susceptible to harsher treatment.

In

Kellough

and Wortley’s (2002) study, male defendants were much more likely to be detained (29.5%) than
female defendants (14.9%). As previously mentioned, pre-trial detention status significantly
impacts case outcomes. By detaining males at nearly twice the rate as females, the system is
practically ensuring higher conviction rates for men. Females were also found to have 63%
greater odds at receiving a downward departure than males and males were found to have 31%
greater odds at receiving an upward departure than female defendants (Johnson, 2003). Another
study by Johnson which examined federal prosecutorial decision-making reinforced these
findings, with male offenders being roughly 0.68 times as likely as female offenders to receive a
charge reduction (Shermer & Johnson, 2010). In Schmidt and Steury’s 1989 study which
examined relevant factors in domestic violence cases, only male on female violence was included
in their definition of domestic violence (Schmidt & Steury, 1989). This blatant disregard of female
offenders is a great limitation of this study and is also indicative of the role implicit bias can play
in criminal justice environments.
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IV.

Implicit Bias
Implicit bias can be used to partially explain the impacts of extralegal factors on charging

and plea-bargaining outcomes. Greenberg posits that implicit bias is the main reason why racial
bias is perpetuated in modern plea bargaining practices (Greenberg, 2021). Greenberg also points
to three specific factors which explain the perpetuation of this bias: the speed of the negotiation
process, the attorneys ignorance of their biases, and the attorneys discretion in deciding
outcomes (Greenberg, 2021). This claim of attorneys being ignorant to their biases is supported
in Barone’s (2013) dissertation which examined female prosecutorial decision-making. In this
dissertation, respondents claimed that they don’t consider any extralegal factors when
determining charges and plea offers (Barone, 2013). This is not a reasonable claim to make, as
social research indicates that everyone has implicit biases which help influence decision-making
(Grenberg, 2021). Implicit biases can cause prosecutors to charge certain groups of people
disproportionately, as is the case with young, black, and male offenders. Greenberg claims that
prosecutors are likely to offer black defendants less favorable plea offers due to these implicit
biases (Greenberg, 2021).
Other research on the racial disparities found in federal sentencing revealed that
unconscious racial bias exists within a federal context as well. One attorney, when discussing with
another attorney about wanting to drop a gun charge against a defendant stated “He is a rural
guy who grew up on a farm. The gun he had with him was a rifle. He is a good ol’ boy, and all the
good ol’ boys have rifles, and it’s not like he was a gun-toting drug dealer,” (Lu, 2007). That
defendant was in fact a gun-toting drug dealer, but the race of the defendant influenced the
attorney’s decision-making process. Implicit bias is also perpetuated through racially-neutral laws
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which disproportionately affect specific races of people (Lu, 2007). For example, the sentencing
ratio for crack-to-cocaine is 100-1, but 85% of people charged with offenses involving crack are
black (Lu, 2007). It is nearly impossible to detect racial bias, so if attempts to reduce the impacts
of implicit bias are to be made, widespread education and sensitivity training must take place
(Lu, 2007). Greth’s (2018) thesis examines whether prosecutors are aware of the concept of
implicit bias and how it may impact their decision-making process. While every respondent was
familiar with the concept of implicit bias, none of the respondents thought it made any difference
in their decision-making process, with one respondent claiming more implicit bias is likely to be
found in a defense attorney’s office. (Greth, 2018).

V.

Conclusion
Defendants with more substantial criminal histories are more likely to get worse plea

offers from prosecutors, and defendants who are charged with more severe charges are less
likely to plead guilty (Subramanian et al., 2020). The strength of the evidence in each case is
perhaps the largest legal factor prosecutors consider when negotiating plea offers, with many
prosecutors reducing charges in cases where the evidence is weak and becoming less willing to
negotiate when evidence is stronger (Redlich et al., 2016; Subramanian et al., 2020). The pre-trial
detention status of a defendant largely influences the likelihood of them pleading guilty and not
having their case dropped by prosecution (Kellough & Wortley, 2002). Extralegal factors such as
the race, age, and gender of a defendant also have impacts on prosecutorial decision-making,
causing the system to disproportionately charge and convict young, black men. The race of a
defendant has a significant impact on the likelihood of receiving both upward and downward
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dismissals (Johnson, 2003). The perpetuation of racial bias is present in the United States’
criminal justice system today primarily due to the implicit bias of the legal actors involved
(Greenberg, 2021). Implicit bias education and sensitivity training would be beneficial in reducing
the impact of implicit bias on decision making processes (Lu, 2007). Overall, a multitude of factors
play a role in determining charging and plea bargaining outcomes for defendants, both legal and
extralegal.
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I.

Introduction
In each criminal case, defendants have the right to an attorney. Defendants either hire

private attorneys or in instances where they cannot afford one, they can have one appointed to
them by their respective county/state. Indigent defendants are defendants who are arrested and
do not have the necessary resources to hire a private attorney. Indigent defense systems are
systems set up by counties and states to provide indigent defenders with legal counsel. There are
three types of indigent defense systems: public defender programs, contract attorney programs,
and assigned counsel programs (Hanson & Ostrom, 2004). Each of these types of programs are
unique in their function but all serve to provide indigent defenders with legal representation.
While a body of research has found the type of attorney a defendant has to have an impact on
criminal justice outcomes, other research has found the type of attorney to have no significant
impact on criminal justice outcomes (Devers, 2011; Hanson & Ostrom, 2004; Hartley et al., 2010).
This paper will provide a background of indigent defense systems in a variety of cities and states,
as well as discuss the existing research which examines the impact the type of attorney has on
different criminal justice outcomes.
II.

Indigent Defense Systems
Indigent defense systems exist to provide defendants who do not have the resources to

hire private attorneys with legal representation for the duration of their case (Hanson & Ostrom,
2004). Indigent defense systems are created and ran at either the state or county level, with 28
states administering their own indigent defense systems, as well as Washington D.C. (Strong,
2016). Twenty-four of the 28 states used multiple delivery methods to provide defense, while
four states relied on one method. In 25 of the states, public defenders were treated as
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government employees (Strong, 2016). While states are required by law to provide legal counsel
to indigent defendants, it does not need to be free. In fact, only six states charge zero fees to use
their indigent defense services (Strong, 2016). Nine states charge defendants both an application
fee and recoupment (the cost of the legal representation itself), while four states only charge an
application fee and ten others only charged recoupment (Strong, 2016). Application fees ranged
from $10 to $212 dollars, and recoupment varied from case to case. Of the three types of indigent
defense systems, public defenders are by far the most popular, closing 67% of the total cases
received by state administered indigent defense programs in 2013 (Strong, 2016). State
administered indigent defense systems have many employees, but caseloads remain high and
have a wide variance. In 2013, caseloads ranged from 50 cases per attorney in Minnesota to 590
cases per attorney in Arkansas (Strong, 2016). Only twelve states and Washington D.C. had
caseload limits for their attorneys.
A 1989 study examined indigent defense systems in nine communities. The communities
varied in size and contained a good mixture of the three types of indigent defense systems
(Hanson & Ostrom, 2004). They were also spread out geographically across the country. Three of
the nine communities received their funding from the state while the remaining six communities
received their funding from their county (Hanson & Ostrom, 2004). Three communities (Seattle,
Denver, and Monterey) used public defender systems, four communities (Detroit, Norfolk,
Oxford, and Island) used assigned counsel systems, and two communities (San Juan and Globe)
used contract systems (Hanson & Ostrom, 2004). These indigent defense systems handled
anywhere from 52.9% to 90% of the cases in their respective communities, with private attorneys
handling the remainder of cases (Hanson & Ostrom, 2004).
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III.

Performance of Indigent Defense Systems
There is a somewhat small body of research dedicated to understanding how indigent

defense systems compare to private attorneys in the criminal justice outcomes they achieve.
Clarke (2021) conducted a small meta-analysis of this body of research, identifying 40 empirical
studies which compared outcomes across attorney types. Results of the meta-analysis found
significant differences between indigent defense systems and private attorneys in six different
court case outcomes: case dismissal, case resolved by plea, case resolved by trial, acquittal,
conviction, and conviction severity (Clarke, 2021). The following section will discuss several
outcomes: time to disposition, case dismissals, charge reductions, sentencing outcomes, and
plea-bargaining outcomes.
Time to Disposition
The same 1989 study found that indigent defenders process cases in less time than private
attorneys in all the communities except Island County (Hanson & Ostrom, 2004). Indigent defense
systems were also found to be better at resolving felony cases within 180 days, which ABA
standards stipulate that 98% of cases be resolved within (Hanson & Ostrom, 2004). While they
performed better, that is not to say they meet ABA standards. In fact, in six of the nine
communities, more than 21% of felony cases remain unresolved after 180 days, and three
communities have more than 44% of felony cases unresolved after 180 days (Hanson & Ostrom,
2004). Hanson & Ostrom identified several implications as a result of indigent defenders solving
cases in less time. One implication is that by resolving cases more quickly, it reduces time spent
in jail for the defendant as well as the times a defendant needs to show up in court (Hanson &
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Ostrom, 2004). It also saves the courts money by needing less court appearances per defendant.
Timeliness is only valuable, however, if it does not come at the expense of the defendant (Hanson
& Ostrom, 2004). If a defendant receives a worse sentence because a defense attorney rushes
through proceedings or doesn’t effectively negotiate a plea deal, is resolving the case in a shorter
time worth it? The next section will examine how public defense systems fared versus private
defense systems, both in court and in plea bargaining processes.
Case Dismissal
Overall, indigent defendants were roughly 25% less likely to have their cases dismissed
than private attorneys, however results contained a large amount of heterogeneity (Clarke,
2021). One report from Harris County, Texas found that public defenders and retained counsel
achieved almost an identical percentage of dismissals. Public defenders had all charges dismissed
in 17% of their cases while private attorneys received full dismissals for 18% of their cases (Fabelo
et al., 2013). Hartley et al. reported findings in their study which used data from Cook County,
Illinois which also suggest type of attorney has no impact on the decision to release a defendant
(Hartley et al., 2010). Another study which analyzed outcomes across attorney types for domestic
violence cases in New York City found that public defenders are less likely to have their cases
dismissed than private counsel during the plea-bargaining process, but more likely to have
charges acquitted in trial settings (Kutateladze & Leimberg, 2019). The previously mentioned
1989 study of nine communities found that dismissal rates were remarkably similar for all types
of attorneys (Hanson & Ostrom, 2004). Champion (1989) found that there was a very significant
difference in the likelihood of cases being dropped, with private attorneys having their cases
dropped 48% of the time while public defenders had their cases dropped just 11.3% of the time
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(Champion, 1989). The heterogeneity of this research is geographical in nature, as studies
conducted in the southeast and southwest regions of the United States were found to have
significantly lower differences in case dismissal rates compared to other geographic regions
(Clarke, 2021).
Charge Reductions
Clarke’s meta-analysis of ten studies found there to be no significant difference in charge
reductions across types of counsel (Clarke, 2021). Hartley et al.’s examination of Cook County
courts also revealed no difference in decisions to reduce primary charges based on attorney type
(Hartley et al., 2010). Further analysis showed that specifically for Black defendants, those with
private counsel were twice as likely to receive a primary charge reduction than those with public
counsel (Hartley et al., 2010). The study of domestic violence cases in New York City found that
defendants with indigent defense were more likely to have charges reduced than defendants
with private counsel (Kutateladze & Leimberg, 2019). Hanson & Ostrom (2014) found there to be
a significant difference in charge reduction rates across attorney type, with contract defense
systems achieving charge reductions 50.9% of the time, versus 31.9% of the time for private
counsel, 26.4% of the time for assigned counsel systems, and 25.7% of the time for public
defenders (Hanson & Ostrom, 2004). Fabelo et al. (2013) also report that in Harris County, Texas,
public and private counsel receive charge reductions within two percentage points of each other.
Generally, the body of research on this area has found there to be no significant difference in
charge reduction rates across types of attorneys.
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Sentencing Outcomes
While there is somewhat of a consensus in the research relating to charge reductions, this
is not the case for sentencing outcomes, where studies have shown conflicting findings. The study
examining New York City domestic violence cases found that indigent defendants were much
more likely to receive custodial sentences than defendants with private attorneys (Kutateladze
& Leimberg, 2019). This finding is consistent in Clarke’s (2021) meta-analysis, in which she found
defendants with indigent defense were significantly more likely to be incarcerated than
defendants with private counsel (OR = 2.265, p<.0001). However, Hartley et al.’s 2010 study of
Cook County Courts found the type of attorney to have no significant impact on the decision to
incarcerate and sentence length (Hartley et al., 2010). A study of sentencing outcomes for
defendants with public defenders versus retained counsel in Florida also reported that type of
attorney had no impact on defendant’s rates of receiving probation, being incarcerated, and
sentence length (Williams, 2002). Hanson & Ostrom found that incarceration rates were lower
for defendants who had private counsel than public defenders (57.1 versus 78.2), but stresses
that while this is the case, the advantage to private attorneys is still limited (Hanson & Ostrom,
2004). They also found that felony defendants with indigent defense ended up incarcerated
72.4% of the time while defendants with private counsel were incarcerated 58.2% of the time
(Hanson & Ostrom, 2004). Results of the meta-analysis showed that studies conducted in the
southwest had higher differences in sentencing across types of counsel (Clarke, 2021). A Harris
County, Texas report found that for defendants facing felony charges, public counsel was more
likely to result in incarceration, while defendants with private counsel were significantly more
likely to receive probation (11% versus 2%) (Fabelo et al., 2013).
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A 2000 report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) which examined the 75 largest
counties along with federal district courts found that defendants with public defense were more
likely to be incarcerated than defendants with private counsel but found defendants with private
counsel more likely to receive longer sentences (Harlow, 2000). While in general this is the case,
results vary by crime type. Defendants with public defenders for representation received longer
sentences for violent crimes on average than defendants with private counsel, but this is reversed
when examining drug offenses (Harlow, 2000).
IV.

Indigent Defense Systems in Plea Bargaining
There is a relatively small body of research dedicated to comparing indigent defense

systems to private attorneys. In fact, Clarke (2021) found only four studies which compared guilty
pleas across attorney type. Public defenders and private attorneys were compared from a
different perspective by McKenzie, who sought to compare the motivations attorneys have to
plea bargain (McKenzie, 2015). He conducted a survey to compare which variables matter most
to attorneys when seeking a plea bargain and when accepting a plea offer (McKenzie, 2015).
There were 133 total respondents composed of 76 public defenders and 57 private attorneys.
Results of the study showed that public defenders consider the defendant’s criminal history to
be the most important variable when seeking a plea deal while private attorneys consider the
difference between the plea offer and the anticipated trial outcome to be most important when
seeking a plea deal (McKenzie, 2015). In regard to accepting pleas, the type of crime was the
most important factor to public defenders, while private attorneys had no factors influence them
significantly (McKenzie, 2015). The study also found that both public defenders and private
attorneys are most influenced by a “supportive collegiality” within the office when seeking plea
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deals (McKenzie, 2015). Public defenders were found to be most influenced by legal/clerical
support when accepting plea deals while private attorneys were not found to be significantly
influenced by any workplace variable (McKenzie, 2015). Champion (1989) found in a survey of
prosecutors that they believe type of attorney makes a difference in plea bargaining. Of the 42
prosecutors that stated the believe public defenders made a difference in outcomes, 36 of them
thought this difference would be less favorable to the defendant (Champion, 1989).
Plea Bargaining Outcomes
The fours studies in the meta-analysis indicated that indigent defendants were
significantly more likely to accept plea offers than defendants with private counsel (Clarke, 2021).
From a sample of 28,315 cases of felony defendants, they were found to accept guilty pleas 36%
of the time when represented by private counsel versus a staggering 87.7% of the time when
represented by public counsel (Champion, 1989). Champion posits that this is due to prosecutors
making a distinction in their plea negotiations based on the type of counsel the defendant has
(Champion, 1989). Some prosecutors also thought that since public defenders are poorly paid,
they view don’t view their cases to be very important (Champion, 1989). A report from the Harris
County Public Defender office in Harris County, Texas, states that public defenders were
significantly more likely to have defendants plead guilty on all charges than private attorneys
(Fabelo et al., 2013). The 2000 BJS report, however, reports very similar guilty plea rates between
public and private counsel. In the 75 largest counties, defendants with public counsel plead guilty
71% of the time while defendants with private counsel plead guilty 72.8% of the time (Harlow,
2000). In the federal district courts, public counsel had defendants plead guilty 87.1% of the time
versus 84.6% of the time for defendants with private counsel (Harlow, 2000). Kutateladze &
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Leimberg (2019) found that in New York City, generally public and private counsel have similar
likelihood to resolve cases by guilty plea. McKenzie (2015) also found that public defenders were
not any more likely than private attorneys to recommend accepting guilty pleas to their
defendants.
V.

Mitigating Factors
Indigent defendants were found to be 75% more likely to be detained pre-trial than

defendants who could afford to hire private counsel (Clarke, 2021). These findings are also
supported by the BJS report, which shows 52.9% of defendants with public counsel released pretrial while 79% of defendants with private counsel were released pre-trial (Harlow, 2000). It has
also been shown that defendants who are detained pre-trial are 46% more likely to plead guilty
(Subramanian et al., 2020). This fact may partially explain the results that show indigent defense
systems are more likely to resolve cases by guilty plea than private attorneys and shows that
quality of defense may not be the only factor which explains this difference (Clarke, 2021; Hartley
et al., 2010). The findings that indigent defendants are more likely to be detained pre-trial should
prompt an examination of the relationship between socioeconomic status and plea bargaining
outcomes
Indigent defendants are also more likely to have criminal records than defendants with
private counsel (Harlow, 2000). Criminal history of the defendant has shown to be one of the
most two important factors in determining plea offers (Devers, 2011; Subramanian et al., 2020)
If defendants have more significant criminal histories, they are more likely to be detained pretrial, receive harsher plea offers, and are more likely to receive plea offers which still include
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incarceration (Subramanian et al., 2020). This fact may partially explain why indigent defense
systems are more likely to have clients end up incarcerated.
VI.

Conclusion
The body of research which compares outcomes across attorney type remains generally

inconclusive. The only factors examined in this paper which had generally homogenous findings
were time to disposition and case dismissal. Public defense systems were found to be faster at
resolving cases than private counsel (Hanson & Ostrom, 2004). Cases are also more likely to end
in dismissal if a defendant has private counsel (Clarke, 2021; Hartley et al., 2010). While most
research on charge reductions and attorney type found little difference on the rate in which
cases have charges reduced, Hanson & Ostrom (2004) found there to be a significant difference
in charge reduction rates across attorney types. The body of research dedicated to sentencing
outcomes is very heterogenous in nature. Some studies reported finding no difference in
incarceration rates and sentence length (Hartley et al., 2010; ;Williams, 2002), however several
studies reported finding significant differences in incarceration rates (Clarke, 2021; Fabelo et
al., 2010; Hanson & Ostrom, 2004; Harlow, 2000). The small body of research on attorney type
and plea bargaining outcomes is not very conclusive. In fact, government reports find very little
difference in the plea bargaining rates in the nations largest counties (Harlow, 2000), however
studies performed in other areas found significant differences in the rate of guilty plea
dispositions (Champion, 1989, Fabelo et al., 2013). Public counsel and private counsel were also
found to have different motivations in seeking and accepting plea offers for their client, and
were also influenced by different workplace variables (McKenzie, 2015). Some of the
differences found in the studies may be due to reasons other than quality of counsel (Hartley et
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al., 2010). Since indigent defendants are much more likely to be held pre-trial and are more
likely to have criminal records, it would make logical sense that they are more likely to attain
worse outcomes because of this. Further research needs to be conducted on the difference in
outcomes between attorney type for any significant conclusions to be made in the area.
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I.

Background
Plea bargaining is an incredibly common practice in the United States criminal justice

system, with over 95% of felony cases being resolved by some sort of plea (Devers, 2011). Plea
bargaining is a process in which a defendant admits their guilt to a crime in exchange for a
lighter sentence. Plea bargaining is considered a “bargain” due to the assumed reduction in
sentence a defendant receives from admitting their guilt. It has been found that on average,
defendants receive a 57% reduction in their sentence if they plead guilty (Subramanian et al.,
2020). The body of research which is dedicated to the plea bargaining process has found many
different legal and extralegal factors which prosecutors may consider during the plea bargaining
process, all of which may have an impact on plea bargaining outcomes. Some of these factors
are the race, gender, and age of the defendant as well as the strength of the evidence in a case
and the defendant’s criminal history (Devers, 2011).
II.

Literature Review
Prior research has shown that race, gender, and criminal history are factors which have

an impact on a defendant’s likelihood to plead guilty (Devers, 2011; Subramanian et al., 2020).
Specifically, criminal history is one of the most important factors in predicting plea bargaining
outcomes for defendants (Devers, 2011). Defendants with more significant criminal histories
were found to be more likely to receive harsher plea offers from prosecutors and are also more
likely to receive plea offers which include incarceration than defendants with no criminal
history (Subramanian et al., 2020). The criminal history of the defendant was also found to be
the most influential factor in public defenders’ decision-making process when seeking a plea
deal for their client (McKenzie, 2015).
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Race has also been shown to have an impact on plea bargaining outcomes (Devers,
2011; Greenberg, 2021; Subramanian et al., 2020). In fact, race is the extralegal factor which
has been shown to have the most consistent findings in outcomes (Devers, 2011). Black
defendants were found to be more likely to be held pre-trial than defendants from other racial
backgrounds, which increases the likelihood of pleading guilty by 46% (Kellough & Wortley,
2002; Subramanian et al., 2020). Other research has found that Black defendants are less likely
to receive charge reductions than white people, and has also found that black people are less
likely to receive reduced sentences in plea bargaining than white defendants because of
decisions made by the prosecutor (Devers, 2011).
Research on the impact of gender in charging and plea bargaining has found that in
general, males tend to receive harsher treatment. Males are more likely to be detained pre-trial
and were also found to be significantly less likely to receive charge reductions than female
defendants (Kellough & Wortley, 2002; Shermer & Johnson, 2010). In sentencing, female
defendants were found to have 63% greater odds of receiving a downward departure than
male defendants, and male defendants had 31% greater odds of receiving an upward departure
from sentencing guidelines (Johnson, 2003).
III.

The Present Study
The present study seeks to examine which factors are most associated with pleading

guilty to lesser charges. This study will examine the impact of a defendant’s race/ethnicity,
gender, and criminal history on the defendant’s likelihood to receive a reduced charge through
a guilty plea. There are two groups of hypotheses which this study will seek to examine,
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comprised of a grand total of eight hypotheses. The distinction between groups is the initial
charge a defendant is charged with, whether it be a felony or misdemeanor.
Group 1:
H1) In felony cases, male defendants will be statistically significantly more likely to plead
guilty to felony charges than female defendants.
H2) In felony cases, Black defendants will be statistically more likely to plead guilty to felony
charges than white defendants.
H3) In felony cases, Hispanic defendants will be statistically significantly more likely to plead
guilty to felony charges than White defendants.
H4) In felony cases, defendants with some known criminal history will be statistically
significantly more likely to plead guilty to felony charges than defendants with no
criminal history.
Group 2:
H5) In misdemeanor cases, male defendants will be statistically significantly more likely to
plead guilty to felony charges than female defendants.
H6) In misdemeanor cases, Black defendants will be statistically significantly more likely to
plead guilty to misdemeanor charges than White defendants.
H7) In misdemeanor cases, Hispanic defendants will be statistically significantly more likely
to plead guilty to misdemeanor charges than White defendants.
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H8) In misdemeanor cases, defendants with some known criminal history will be statistically
significantly more likely to plead guilty to misdemeanor charges than defendants with
no criminal history.
IV.

Data/Methodology
Data was obtained through New York County’s District Attorney’s Office (DANY). Since

case-level data was not readily available, several queries were completed to obtain the data
used in this analysis. Queries were performed to obtain the total number of cases for each
dependent variable (plea to felony, plea to misdemeanor, plea to violation/infraction) for both
felony and misdemeanor cases in the year 2018. A separate query was performed for each
independent variable (race, gender, and criminal history).
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in this study are the three final possible case dispositions. Plea
to Felony is a variable which captures the total number of cases in which the defendant pleads
guilty to felony charges. This outcome is only possible for cases in which the initial charge is a
felony. Plea to Misdemeanor captures the total number of cases in which the defendant pleads
guilty to misdemeanor charges, and Plea to Violation/Infraction captures the total number of cases
in which the defendant pleads guilty to a violation/infraction. Cases where the initial charge was either a
felony or misdemeanor are eligible for both outcomes.

Independent Variables
The independent variables in this study are the race/ethnicity, gender, and criminal
history of the defendant in each case. The Race/Ethnicity variable captures cases which involve
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White, Black, and Hispanic defendants. Other races/ethnicities have not been given
consideration in this study. The Gender variable captures cases which involve male or female
defendants. Other genders are unavailable to be accounted for as the data did not make the
distinction between defendants whose gender was not male or female and defendants whose
gender was unknown. The Criminal History variable captures whether defendants have any
known criminal history or not.
Methodology
A total of six different crosstabulations were completed to answer the research
questions presented earlier. Two crosstabulations were completed for each independent
variable: one crosstabulation which included felony cases and one which involved misdemeanor
cases. Chi-square tests were also completed to measure the statistical significance of any
relationship between the independent and dependent variables.
V.

Results
In Manhattan, NY in 2018, there were a total of 29,082 cases which were disposed of

with a conviction. There was a total of 6,853 felony convictions in which the defendant plead
guilty, and 21,609 misdemeanor convictions in which the defendant plead guilty. These two
subsets of data will be used to answer the research questions in Group 1 and Group 2,
respectively.
Group 1
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Fig. 1

Fig. 2
The chi-square test results (Chi-Square = 139.096, p <.001) show there is a statistically
significant relationship between gender and final plea disposition in felony cases. However, the
difference is not found in felony pleas, but rather misdemeanor and violation pleas. Male
defendants were found to be almost twenty times more likely than female defendants to plea
to violations/infractions (17.7% versus 0.9%), while female defendants were found to be 1.41
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times more likely to plead guilty to misdemeanors as male defendants. Therefore, H1 cannot be
accepted.

Fig. 3

Fig. 4
The chi-square test results (Chi-Square = 56.475, p<.001) indicates that there is a
statistically significant relationship between the race of a defendant and final plea disposition in
felony cases. Fig. 3 shows that Black and Hispanic defendants are roughly 1.4 times more likely
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to plead guilty to felonies than white defendants (~39% versus 27.9%). All groups plead guilty to
misdemeanors at similar rates, indicating the difference is made up for in pleas to
violations/infractions. The results of this test allow us to reject the null hypotheses for H2 & H3,
indicating that Black and Hispanic defendants are more likely to plead guilty to felonies than
White defendants in felony cases.

Fig. 5
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Fig. 6
The chi-square test results (Chi-Square = 497.864, p<.001) indicate that there is a
statistically significant relationship between the criminal history of a defendant and the final
plea disposition in felony cases. While defendants with no criminal history resolve cases
relatively evenly across each disposition, defendants with some known criminal history very
rarely plead guilty to violations/infractions, just 3.9% of the time. They are statistically
significantly more likely to accept pleas to both felonies (50.7% compared to 33.5%) and
misdemeanors (45.4% versus 33.0%). The results of these tests allow us to reject the null
hypothesis for H4.
Group 2
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Fig. 7

Fig. 8
The results of the chi-square test (Chi-square = 103.924, p<.001) indicate that there is a
relationship between a defendant’s gender and the final plea disposition in misdemeanor cases.
As shown in Fig. 8, male defendants were found to be 1.26 times more likely to plead guilty to
misdemeanors than female defendants (48.1% versus 38.3%). Therefore, we reject the null
hypothesis for H5.
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Fig. 9

Fig. 10
The results of the chi-square test (Chi-square = 230.748, p<.001) reveal that there is
indeed a relationship between the race/ethnicity of the defendant and the final plea disposition
in misdemeanor cases. H6, which posited that Black defendants will be more likely to plead
guilty to misdemeanor charges than White defendants, is supported by the results (53.3%
versus 44.1%), allowing us to reject the null hypothesis in support of H6. The null hypothesis for
H7 cannot be rejected as Hispanic defendants were found to be less likely to plead guilty to a
misdemeanor than White defendants (42.2% versus 44.1%).
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Fig. 11

Fig. 12
The results of the chi-square test (Chi-square = 5316.578, p<.001) show that there is a
relationship between the criminal history of the defendant and the final plea disposition
defendants receive in misdemeanor cases. As shown in Fig. 11, defendants with a known
criminal history are 4.29 times more likely to plead guilty to misdemeanors (84.1%) than
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defendants with no criminal history (19.6%). Therefore, the null hypothesis for H8 can be
rejected.
VI.

Discussion
The review of the existing literature in this analysis has shown that while some research

has been conducted on plea bargaining, there are several holes in the data. While studies have
focused on the impact of particular legal or extralegal factors in the plea bargaining process,
there is a very limited number of studies which examine the relationship between these legal
and extralegal variables and the final plea disposition attained. The results of the analysis
support some previous research regarding plea bargaining outcomes and reveal several
implications. Overall, six hypotheses were supported by the analysis, while two hypotheses
could not be accepted (H1 and H7). Firstly, the analysis supports previous findings that male
defendants are less likely to receive plea reductions than female defendants, specifically in
misdemeanor cases. It was surprising to find that men typically fared better in felony cases than
women. This is likely due to some mixture of other legal and extralegal factors which could be
accounted for in a regression analysis. This study also supports the findings that Black and
Hispanic defendants typically fare worse than White defendants in both felony and
misdemeanor cases (Black defendants only). This supports Greenberg’s assertion that plea
bargaining is not practiced in a “racially neutral way,” despite legislation existing to ensure this
(Greenberg, 2021). This analysis also specifically supports findings that Black defendants are
less likely to receive charge reductions and less likely to receive reduced sentences through
accepting pleas than white defendants (Devers, 2011). Defendants with criminal histories were
found to be significantly more likely to attain worse plea outcomes than defendants with no
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criminal history. This relationship is the strongest relationship examined in this study, with
defendants being more than 4 times more likely to plead guilty to worse outcomes in
misdemeanor cases, and 1.5 times more likely to plead guilty to felonies than defendants with
no criminal history. This further adds to the findings that defendants with more significant
criminal histories are likely to be offered worse plea offers by prosecutors (Subramanian et al.,
2020).
VII.

Limitations & Future Study
There are several limitations which restrict this data analysis. Firstly, the data only

captures cases from the year 2018. If the same analysis was completed for a caseload spanning
multiple years, it would be easier to identify trends in the data and would produce more
reliable results. Another limitation of this study was the lack of availability of case-level data.
Because of this, the results of this analysis are inferred from aggregates of case totals rather than being
directly observed through each case. Had the independent variables been observable at the case-

level, much more rigorous analyses (i.e., linear regression) could be conducted with the data to
control for the presence of other variables. This points to the next limitation of the analysis. The
study did not fully capture the complexity of each case. For example, when comparing the
differences in plea dispositions between male and female defendants, it is strictly comparing
that relationship without accounting for the presence of other variables which may also impact
outcomes (i.e., race, criminal history). So, while the results of the analysis are still accurate,
they may be slightly skewed because of this. Further examination of this relationship is required
for more meaningful findings to be obtained.
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VIII.

Conclusion
This analysis was conducted in order to determine if there is a relationship between

certain legal and extralegal factors and the final guilty plea disposition obtained by defendants.
By conducting chi-square tests, results which supported six of the eight final hypotheses were
found. The race/ethnicity, gender, and criminal history of defendants were all found to impact
final plea dispositions in either felony or misdemeanor cases. The criminal history of the
defendant was especially impactful in both felony and misdemeanor cases, suggesting that legal
factors provide stronger predictors for outcomes than extralegal factors, which is consistent
with prior findings (Devers, 2011). Race was also found to have an impact in both felony and
misdemeanor cases, however ethnicity was only shown to impact felony case outcomes.
Gender impacted both types of cases, however not in a way that supports my first hypothesis.
While these results show these relationships, more rigorous analyses with case-level data is
necessary to build on this analysis.
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